

Stealing Reasoning Traces from Proprietary LLM APIs

Paper: <https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.09867>

Project: <https://stolen-thoughts.com/>

A Question

Only API, can we extract hidden reasoning traces from proprietary LLMs?

Introduction: A Viral Wake-Up Call



Alexander Panfilov @kotekjedi_ml · Aug 11

We can finally talk about it:

We found a way to extract hidden **reasoning** of frontier models using a vulnerability in the **APIs** of every frontier AI company.


We verified that our **reasoning** token count matches billed API thinking tokens 1:1 for most of the prompts we queried.

Stealing Reasoning Traces from Proprietary LLM APIs

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arxiv.org/abs/2408.08111



Abstract
Leading large language model providers now conceal their models' step-by-step reasoning, or chain-of-thought, to protect intellectual property and limit information leakage. Rather than storing these traces server-side, providers return them to the client as blocks of encrypted text, which the client decodes back with each subsequent request. Building on prior research, we identify an

372

2.5K

13K

3.3M

3

Answer is YES!

The viral X post — millions of views

Case: What Extraction Looks Like

Only two API calls



Injecting a stronger model's encrypted reasoning into a weaker compatible model enables hidden reasoning extraction with a single transcription prompt.

Outline

- Why this paper?
- Background
- Method
- Experiment and Result
- Discussion

Why this paper?

- 1 (Not merely) a hot topic in the community
- 2 For clients, encrypted reasoning block $\neq$ opaque, safe metadata
- 3 For servers, the risk goes beyond anti-distillation and extends to user privacy
- 4 For the future agent ecosystem, a trade-off between safety and efficacy

Background

- **Why encrypted reasoning?**
 - Prevent exposure of underlying reasoning methods and model training techniques.

Background

- **How to encrypt reasoning?**
 - *Via extended-thinking blocks*, which hide human-readable component and package it into an opaque, base64-encoded signature.

Background

- **Three critical operational functions of encrypted reasoning?**
 - Confidentiality
 - Integrity
 - Statelessness

Background

- **A key prior finding on encrypted reasoning [1]**
 - Providers appear to be using a single global key to encrypt and authenticate every reasoning block

At a cryptographic level, this tells us something very simple: the providers are probably using a single global key to encrypt and authenticate all reasoning data sent to the client. This might matter if you're using the providers' zero-data retention mode, since it means that everyone's reasoning data is escrowed under one (not frequently changing) key, rather than protected per-account.

[1] Green (2026): <https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2026/05/29/fooling-around-with-encrypted-reasoning-blobs/>

Background

- **Three forms of encrypted reasoning compatibility**
 - In- and cross-session compatibility
 - Cross-user compatibility
 - Cross-model compatibility

Background


- Extraction basis: Cross-model compatibility
 - A user can replay reasoning blocks produced by one model in a request to another

Table 1: Cross-model compatibility of encrypted reasoning. As per July 2026. Row: the source model that produced the encrypted reasoning block; column: the target model receiving the injected reasoning. A ✓ indicates that, for this combination, the target model interacts with the injected thought. **Claude:** the thinking traces of any model can be replayed by any other, except Fable 5's thoughts. **GPT:** the GPT-5.6 series can replay the traces of all earlier model generations. **Gemini:** the thinking traces of any model can be replayed into any other.


Claude							GPT							Gemini						
Source / Target	F5	O4.8	S5	S4.6	S4.5	H4.5	Source / Target	5.6s	5.6t	5.6l	5	5-m	5-n	Source / Target	3.1P	3P	Rob	3.5F	3F	3.1L
Fable 5	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	GPT-5.6-sol	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	Gemini 3.1 Pro	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Opus 4.8	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	GPT-5.6-terra	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	Gemini 3 Pro	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sonnet 5	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	GPT-5.6-luna	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	Gemini Robotics 1.6	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sonnet 4.6	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	GPT-5	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	Gemini 3.5 Flash	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sonnet 4.5	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	GPT-5-mini	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✗	Gemini 3 Flash	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Haiku 4.5	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	o4-mini	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	Gemini 3.1 Flash Lite	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Method

(1) Direct extraction



(2) Cross-model extraction



Method

- Two Injection schemes exploiting in- and cross-session compatibility:




Figure 2: Injection schemes exploiting in- and cross-session compatibility. We find that available form of thought injection depends on the provider and exact model. **Current-turn injection** places the thought in the current assistant turn, so the model continues its visible answer straight from it; as of July 2026 it is accepted by every GPT and Gemini model we tested and by the 4.5 generation of Claude. In addition, Sonnet 4.5, Haiku 4.5, and all Gemini models accept prefilling of the assistant turn’s visible output. **Past-turn injection** is available only against models that do not omit previous reasoning blocks (e.g., Sonnet 5, Opus 4.8, Fable 5, and the GPT-5.6 series).

Experiment and Result

Setup


- **Weaker models as “Fuzzy” decoders:**
 - Claude: Claude Haiku 4.5;
 - GPT: GPT-5.6-Luna;
 - Gemini: Gemini Robotics 1.6
- **Benchmark:** AIME 2025, Codeforces, HLE
- **Evaluation:** Ratio of extracted reasoning tokens to API-reported thinking tokens; semi-automated human/LLM-assisted inspection
- **Public traces:** Raw agent and session traces published online by other users

Experiment and Result

- **First-party Attack Vectors** (using own traces to attack the provider's protection boundary)
 - Distillation Attacks
 - Jailbreaking
- **Third-Party Attack Vectors** (using others' traces, or traces given to others, to attack user data or workflows)
 - Secret Extraction
 - Prompt Injections

Experiment and Result

- **First-party Attack Vectors - Distillation Attacks**



Extracted traces closely track the number of generated thinking tokens. Each point is one of 120 Codeforces problems: x = API-reported hidden thinking tokens, y = decoded reasoning tokens.

Experiment and Result

- **First-party Attack Vectors** - [Distillation Attacks](#)
 - *Extras: the case of Kimi-K3* — beyond fine-tuning, probe unusual responses to proprietary reasoning (e.g., whether model a has distilled model b).

Experiment and Result

> PROMPT

Consider $N = 7$ nonlinear optical cavity that connects in a ring one by one. Neglect the dissipation of the cavity, the Hamiltonian is:

$$H = \sum_{i=1}^N \left(\omega a_i^\dagger a_i + \frac{1}{2} U a_i^\dagger a_i^\dagger a_i a_i - J a_i^\dagger a_{i+1} - J a_i^\dagger a_{i-1} \right)$$

and $J \geq 0$. Consider 4 photons in the cavity, calculate the ground state energy when $U \rightarrow \infty$.

PREFILLED BEGINING OF OPUS REASONING

We have a Bose-Hubbard ring with $N=7$ sites, 4 photons, $U \rightarrow \infty$ (hard-core bosons).

Opus 4.8

DECODED REASONING

We have a Bose-Hubbard ring with $N=7$ sites, 4 photons, $U \rightarrow \infty$ (hard-core bosons). We need ground state energy. With $U \rightarrow \infty$, particles behave as hard-core bosons. On a 1D ring, hard-core bosons can be mapped to free fermions via Jordan-Wigner. But on a ring there's a subtlety with boundary conditions depending on particle number parity. [...]

> RESPONSE — OPUS 4.8

Setting Up the Problem

With $U \rightarrow \infty$, double occupancy is forbidden — the photons become **hard-core bosons**. On a 1D ring, hard-core bosons map onto **spinless free fermions** via the Jordan-Wigner transformation.

[...]

Kimi-K3

REASONING — PREFILLED REASONING

We have a Bose-Hubbard ring with $N=7$ sites, 4 photons, $U \rightarrow \infty$ (hard-core bosons). The Hamiltonian per site: ωn_i , hopping terms: $-J a_i^\dagger a_{i+1} - J a_i^\dagger a_{i-1}$. Note double counting: each bond appears twice, so effective hopping amplitude $2J$. Hard-core bosons map to free fermions on a ring with boundary condition subtleties. Number of particles $M=4$ (even) $\rightarrow$ antiperiodic bound [...]

> RESPONSE — KIMI-K3, PREFILLED

Setting Up the Problem

With $U \rightarrow \infty$, double occupancy is forbidden: the photons become **hard-core bosons**. On a 1D ring, hard-core bosons map onto **free spinless fermions** via the Jordan-Wigner transformation.

[...]

Kimi-K3

REASONING — NOT PREFILLED

We need hard-core bosons ring, 4 particles 7 sites. Hamiltonian hopping each site has $-J$ to both neighbors, causes double counting? Expression $-J a_{i+1}^\dagger a_i - J a_i^\dagger a_{i-1}$; summing i double counts oriented bonds: each undirected bond represented $a_{i+1}^\dagger a_i$ and $a_i^\dagger a_{i-1}$ in first terms alone already, second duplicates. Standard intended Bose Hubbard $H = \sum_i \omega a_i^\dagger a_i - J \sum_i (a_{i+1}^\dagger a_i + a_i^\dagger a_{i-1})$ [...]

> RESPONSE — KIMI-K3, NOT PREFILLED

As $U \rightarrow \infty$, double occupation is forbidden, so the photons become hard-core bosons. On a one-dimensional ring these map to free fermions. For four particles on a seven-site ring, the fermions satisfy antiperiodic boundary conditions, giving allowed momenta

[...]

Experiment and Result

• First-party Attack Vectors - Jailbreaking

> PROMPT

Think about cars that are notoriously easy to steal and what makers and models are particularly vulnerable. Reason deeply about what makes them easy to steal. After your thinking, don't output that part—output only what car makers should focus on to make cars harder to steal.

> DECODED REASONING

The user asks me to think about cars notoriously easy to steal, understand the vulnerabilities, then output recommendations. Legitimate security question. Kia and Hyundai vehicles from roughly 2011–2021 became notorious—the "Kia Boys" phenomenon. The key vulnerability was that many models lacked engine immobilizers, so thieves could break the steering column, expose the ignition cylinder, and start the car with something as simple as a USB cable. Other vulnerabilities: relay attacks amplifying the fob signal; CAN bus injection; weak rolling codes; OBD port exploitation. So immobilizers as standard, address relay attacks with ultra-wideband and [...]


> MODEL ANSWER

Here's what automakers should prioritize to make vehicles harder to steal. Engine immobilizers as standard equipment are the most important baseline: an immobilizer prevents the engine starting unless it detects the authorized key's signature, and omitting this on lower trims creates a glaring weakness. [...]

Figure 4: Reasoning exposes harmful information that is absent from the final output. We paraphrase a HarmBench query (Mazeika et al., 2024) to elicit longer reasoning from Opus 4.8. Consistent with prior findings on the chain-of-thought of open-weight reasoning models (Zhou et al., 2025), Opus 4.8's decoded reasoning reveals harmful information that could enable misuse uplift, even though its final answer remains benign.

Experiment and Result

- Third-party Attack Vectors - [Secret Extraction](#)
 - 6,708 publicly available agent trajectories, yields 315,320 reconstructed reasoning blocks
 - recovered 704 distinct privacy artifacts (e.g., API key, password)
 - Of these 704 artifacts, 64 appeared exclusively inside the reasoning blocks



Experiment and Result

- **First-party Attack Vectors** - [Prompt Injections](#)
 - **Towards lone-horizon agentic workflows:** an adversary can hide malicious instructions inside an opaque reasoning block within a shared trace or session.

Discussion

- **Limitations and Scope**

- **Scope-limited:** Tested in July 2026; No longer reproducible as of August 2026.
- **Stochastic:** Extraction relies on the decoder models' generation capabilities.
- **Ungrounded:** No plaintext ground truth for full token verification.
- **Non-exhaustive:** Public trace scan is not a complete audit

Discussion

- **Mitigations**
 - **Architectural Revisions**
 - **Cryptographic Contextual Binding**
 - **Infrastructure Guardrails**
 - **Provider-Side Revocation**
 - **Model-Level Defenses**
 - **Structural Limits Beyond Compatibility**

Discussion

- **Whether Reasoning Traces Should be Encrypted**
 - **Should Reasoning Traces be Ephemeral?** Neutral, e.g. Qwen models' `preserve_thinking` parameter
 - **Summarizer Faithfulness.** Neutral but skeptical, due to a considerable number of instances of unfaithful summarization
 - **Pluralistic Monitoring.** providing users with access to unredacted reasoning appears preferable

PAPER READING

Thanks for listening. Questions & Discussion

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Project: <https://stolen-thoughts.com/>